Trap-setting in the struggle for power

President Goodluck Jonathan’s media chat was more of a minus-plus. Accordingly, he remains standing with his future political fate to be decided by his party’s nomination exercise. All the same, he opened new areas of contention. He would not be Goodluck Jonathan if he did not. Out of the lot, two are very remarkable.
The first is that he cannot make his stand known on whether he will contest the 2015 presidential election moreso, as he claimed though wrongly, in compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act. The second contentious point Jonathan made was the denial of any agreement with anybody or group, NOT to contest in 2015. At a glance, it may appear that Jonathan upset all criticisms on the two points, which is not the case.
It is not correct, as Jonathan claimed, that he would be violating the Electoral Act if he declared his intention to contest the 2015 presidential elections. Specifically, the act neither limits the timing of declaration of intent to contest, nor criminalises declaration of the intent. The only violation under the Electoral Act is election campaign if commenced before three months to the elections, a stipulation which in itself violates series of fundamental human rights under Nigerian constitution. Some of these are right to assemble, right to hold and express political views, etc.
Equally, it is a matter of honour and integrity on any matter of agreement among associates or contemporaries. From all indications, the controversy on whether Jonathan should have contested the 2011 elections could not have died down within the PDP without some sort of agreement. The only snag might be that in that particular case,  the agreement was not documented and if insisted on by one of the parties to the agreement, could easily have been  interpreted as lack of trust in fellow party men. Unfortunately, that trust emerges today to have been misplaced.
On the other hand, Jonathan’s opponents within the PDP have poorly mishandled their case in basing their challenge to a determination to return the presidency to the North. Hence, the counter punch of Jonathan’s supporters that their man (quite rightly) is entitled to two terms of four years each under the constitution. Jonathan’s opponents could have, instead, faulted him for lack of integrity in dishonouring a gentleman’s agreement, a stand which could be pursued to the convention for the nomination.
By the way, Jonathan, in denying any agreement to serve for only one term, dared his opponents to produce any evidence as proof. On that score, those who must be most embarrassed are the Governor of Niger State, Babangida Aliyu, and Katsina State Governor, Shema. The challenge to Jonathan to honour the disputed agreement was first thrown by Governor Aliyu. From the least expected quarters, Senator Kanti Bello came to the defence of President Jonathan that there was never such an agreement.
That further widened the row over the agreement as Governor Shema impliedly affirmed the existence of the agreement about which he claimed Senator Kanti Bello, also from Katsina, was ignorant. Jonathan has since turned the table against Governor Shema by recruiting him for the dog fight against Rivers State Governor, Chibuke Amaechi, in the battle for the leadership of Nigerian Governors Forum. Sensing defeat by Amaechi, Katsina’s Shema stepped down for Plateau State Governor, Jonah Jang, who still lost to Amaechi. Little wonder that Jonathan is now so frontal  in challenging anybody, who cares for the proof of the agreement.
No matter the strong feelings, history both at home and abroad is on Goodluck Jonathan’s side. In Nigeria, in particular, dishonouring agreement had always been employed as a trap employed by public figures to have the edge over rivals.
In 1992, Egyptian veteran diplomat, Boutros Ghali, was virtually selected by the United States as the sixth Secretary-General of the United Nations, strictly on the condition that he would serve for only one term of four years. When the moment came in 1996, Boutros Ghali insisted on running for a second term. When reminded on why he changed his mind against the honourable agreement  to serve for only one term, Boutros Ghali responded, “only a fool does not change his mind.”
That submission may attract Goodluck Jonathan except that United States vetoed Boutros Ghali out of office after only one term as the sixth Secretary-General of United Nations.
Political trap from which the victim never escaped the predator. That was what politicians made of every seeming gentleman’s agreement. The 1959 pre-independence federal elections ended in a federal coalition government between Tafawa Balawa’s Northern Peoples Congress and Nnamdi Azikiwe’s NCNC, with Balewa as Prime Minister and Zik as governor-general, later president in 1963. The implications were not obvious until 1964 constitutional crisis over that year’s federal elections.
It suddenly emerged that unlike before independence, executive powers, especially authority over armed forces rested in the Prime Minister. So, the President/Commander-in-Chief, Nnamdi Azikiwe, was advised by his legal experts, federal  attorney-general Taslim Elias, and legal adviser, Dan Ibekwe. The dispute over the allegedly rigged 1964 federal elections was, therefore, settled for “a broad-based NATIONAL government.”
When Balewa submitted his cabinet list, it was for only a broad-based government, deliberately excluding one of the major political parties to create a schism with its alliance partner for alleged betrayal. In the struggle for political power, that might even be tolerable. Why unite your opponents with strength against the next round of a contest?
The initial January 1966 military coup and the counter-coup of July 1966 were apparent traps. The January version was touted as a revolution, which by historical standard is ever all-consuming.
The revolt was partially consuming, a justification similarly touted for the counter-coup six months later. Also partially, if disproportionately consuming, the next in the chain of command, whatever his role or aim during the bloody events, was trapped and had to escape aboard a ship to United Kingdom where he was announced as Nigeria’ new high commissioner.
Owing to disturbing uncertainty about Nigeria’s future and indeed survival, a reconciliation conference was held at Aburi, Ghana, presided over by the military ruler, General Ankrah. The agreement voluntarily signed by the two sides turned out to be a trap, perhaps, unintended but which nonetheless not only prolonged but worsened the crisis, leading to the civil war. Aburi was not honoured.
After the cancellation of the June 12, 1993 elections, naive politicians and elites openly called on General Sani Abacha to “save the country” with the bargain from him that he would, on assuming office, de-annul the elections. General Abacha further ridiculed the elite and politicians by declaring that “the June 12, 1993 election was a watershed.” Politicians were encouraged not only to take appointments as ministers but also to recommend elite and intellectuals to fall into the trap.
It was laughable that Nigerians, desperate for ministerial appointments, believed General Abacha would risk his life in a military coup to hand-over soonest to civilians. It was no escape for the next five years.
To appease the South-West for the largely peaceful but unrelenting opposition to the cancellation of the June 12, 1993 elections, retired General Olusegun Obasanjo was recruited and imposed on Nigeria by his political benefactors, General Ibrahim Babangida, General Abdulsalami Abubakar and Lt. General Aliyu Gusau. The understanding was that Obasanjo would serve one term of four years, as an elected president. Obasanjo agreed but it was a trap for his benefactors.
Obasanjo breached the agreement and contested second term, which he also attempted to breach with the futile third term bid.
On his part, Goodluck Jonathan presumably agreed with his party and governor colleagues to contest for one term. If Jonathan now breaches the agreement, it is a pattern not only in Nigeria politics over the years but also in the Old PDP.
There was this other fact, dating back to 2010 or shortly before 2011 elections. Media widely reported that at a National Working Committee (or a special caucus) meeting of the PDP, Jonathan was confronted by genuine doubters and tactfully requested to commit himself to contesting for only one term. Jonathan, according to the same newspaper reports, neither confirmed nor challenged the request. Tony Anenih saved the rising tension by promising that Jonathan would serve only one term. How far Tony Anenih’s assurance can be valid or tenable in the present circumstances is anybody’s guess.
Given the history and standard practice in the PDP, everybody distrusts another. That was the message the new President Jonathan sent out in 2010 when he instantly sacked the then national chairman, Vincent Ogbulafor, for announcing that Jonathan  would not contest the Presidency in 2011.
In the matter of mutual distrust among PDP members, two dicey events are worth recalling. The possibility could then be there that if Jonathan had agreed to step down in 2011 with a promise (or agreement, which is never honoured) to be allowed to contest in 2015, the poor chap might have been played out.
Equally, if the core PDP had fallen for President Goodluck  Jonathan on his new mandate in 2011, in the attempt to amend the constitution to introduce a single six or seven-year term, especially on the public assurance that he, Goodluck Jonathan, would not contest under the proposed amended constitutions, he, Jonathan, too would have trapped the country.
In the PDP, the main expertise is trap-setting. Accordingly, the lesson for our public figures is that any such agreement must be in the hand-writing of the conceding party and signed by all the parties involved. It must also be so worded that the agreement is legally binding on all the parties concerned.
Integrity would thereby have been restored to any undertaking by our public figures.